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1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and tablets have become part of our daily life. e number of such smart devices keeps growing year aer
year1. Android is the most popular mobile operating system and has grown into a diverse ecosystem worldwide.
Unfortunately, the success of Android has also aracted malware developers: it is estimated that about a 12% of apps
in the Google play market are ”low quality apps”2, many of them represent a real risk for the smartphone owner.
ere exist in the literature many systems to detect Android malware using classical detection approaches. For
example, in [17], the authors have developed an Android Malware analysis tool and review malware behavior based on
a 1-Million sample of Android applications, highlighting dierences between malware and goodware. Elish et al [8]
have proposed a single-feature classication system based on user behavior proling. In general, Android permissions
have had a wide coverage and works like [9, 23] analyze them in detail.
1See hp://www.smartinsights.com/mobile-marketing/mobile-marketing-analytics/mobile-marketing-statistics/, last access: March 2017
2See hp://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps, last access: July 2017
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Concerning the use of Machine Learning (ML) techniques in the detection of malware, the authors in [2] have
gathered features from application code and manifest (permissions, API calls, etc) and use Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) to identify dierent types of malware families. In a dierent approach, the authors of [5] have proposed a
system based on the dierential-intersection analysis of applications in order to spot duplicates.
Antivirus Soware has been persistently analyzed and tested. For instance, the authors in [12] have reviewed the key
points in designing AV engines for mobile devices as well as how to avoid detection. In a dierent approach, Rastogi
et al [21] have assessed whether AV engines fall for obfuscation aacks, nding many to be vulnerable to some kind
of transformation aack. e authors in [19] have performed data analytics on multi-scanner outputs for Android
Applications to nd their behavior paerns.
With the advent of AV multi-scanner tools, such as Meta-Scan, Virustotal or Androguard, any application can easily
be analyzed by many dierent AV engines at once. For each detected application, these tools typically identify the AV
engines who agged the application as malware, its type and other meta-data regarding the nature of the threat. Hence,
multi-scanner tools enable simultaneous analysis of suspicious applications and provides some information to identify
and deal with many types of malware.
e authors in [3] perform a comparison of AV engines from VirusTotal by modeling AV condence using a hyper-
exponential curve. In [10], AV labels from VirusTotal are subject to temporal analysis using a collection of malware
applications obtained through a honeypot network. Additionally, other studies [4, 6] have shown the advantages of
using more than one AV engine to improve malware decisions, by means, for example, of multi-scanner tools.
Nevertheless, the authors in [14] recall the lack of agreement on which application each AV considers as malware.
Besides, Maggi et al. [18] extensively review the inconsistencies when assigning identiers to similar threats across
engines. In this light, the authors in [15] propose a combination scheme for multi-scanner detections based on a
Generative Bayesian model to infer the probability of being malware for every sample, however no specic label
analysis is performed, and thus all threats are treated equally.
Several authors have analyzed and proposed categorization schemes for Android malware applications. In [29] the
authors nd up to 49 distinct malware families whilst the authors in [25] propose a text mining approach to obtain
and classify malware families according to application code. Similarly, Zheng et al propose in [28] a system for the
collection and categorization of zero-day malware samples into dierent families. Also, the authors in [7] propose a
system to classify malware samples according to their families.
Sebastia´n et al. [24] propose AVClass, a system to normalize AV labels from dierent vendors and determine the
actual class out dierent detection outputs for the same applications. Nevertheless, AVClass does not link AV engines
with their detections. Instead, it provides the frequency for each token and chooses the most probable one. Besides,
AVClass removes common malware-related tokens. is way, tokens such as Adware or Trojan are removed and the
information they carry is missed. Consequently, the output of AVClass gives a nal malware class output, but loses
information on (AV, class) pairs in the process.
In this light, we develop an alternative label normalization methodology based on the well-known minhashing
technique [16]. is system relies on the user to nally assign normalized labels by using python regular expressions over
signatures. is way, unsupervised aggregation of signatures can be achieved, considerably reducing the supervising
eort of the researcher.
en, such methodology will enable cross-engine analysis of malware classes to improve malware classication. In a
nutshell, is work contributes to this aim with a twofold eort:
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(1) We develop a methodology for signature normalization; that is, group together identiers referring to the same
threat but diering on the actual labels because of AV engine inconsistencies.
(2) We model AV engine relationships using Structural Equation Models (SEM) across malware categories aiming
at the improvement malware classication.
e rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data collection and our AV signature normal-
ization methodology. Section 3 inspects engines and signature tokens using correlations to unveil consensual subsets of
entities. Section 4 develops dierent weighting models to evaluate engine performance of distinct malware categories.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main ndings of this work and highlights the most relevant conclusions.
2 DATASET DESCRIPTION AND SIGNATURE NORMALIZATION
In this article, the dataset under study comprises a total of 82, 866 dierent Android applications collected from Google
Play by TACYT3 in May 2015. All these applications are considered suspicious, as they have been agged by at least
one out of 61 antivirus (AV) engines, including some of the most popular ones (e.g. McAee, Trend Micro, etc.) as
well as many others. ese engines have been anonymized to preserve privacy, i.e. every engine has been substituted
consistently by one of the names in the range AV1, . . . ,AV61 throughout the paper.
When a malware engine detects a suspicious application, it provides a signature containing some meta-data, like its
last scan date or malware class identier. A total of 259, 608 signatures are obtained in our dataset (i.e. 3.13 signatures
per application on average).
As an example, consider application no. 1, 345, agged by AV27, AV28 and AV58. Each AV engine provides dierent
signatures, namely:
• AV27: a variant of Android/AdDisplay.Startapp.B
• AV28: Adware/Startapp.A
• AV58: Adware.AndroidOS.Youmi.Startapp (v)
Clearly, all three engines consider app no. 1, 345 as an adware-like application, but the signature name convention is
dierent for each engine. us, text processing and text mining techniques are necessary to convert signatures into a
common format for analysis.
2.1 Cleaning and classification of AV signatures with Minhashing
Fig. 1 shows a wordcloud with the most popular AV-generated raw signatures and their frequencies (most popular
keywords are shown with large font sizes). Apart from some common understandable signatures, most of them include
dierent names which account for dierent types of malware and other non-malicious names (i.e. AndroidOS).
Some signatures contain common substrings across dierent AVs, including related chunks of text regarding very
common malware types such as ”PUA” or ”Trojan” to more specic types such as ”GingerMaster” or ”FakeFlash” together
with some related terms which do not refer to malware, namely AndroidOS or win32.
To extract meaningful information from signatures, we have developed a methodology to clean, unify and normalize
detection identiers into a xed subset of ”identier tokens” representing the most frequent keywords contained
within the signatures. is process starts with conventional text-mining cleaning techniques of raw strings, including
lower-casing, removing punctuation and domain-specic stop-words (i.e. tokens providing no malware information)
3See hps://www.elevenpaths.com/es/tecnologia/tacyt/index.html for further details
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Fig. 1. Wordcloud image of dierent raw signatures across the dataset
and spliing each signature into tokens separated by dots. Up to this point, our methodology follows the steps of
AVClass [24].
Next, we use the well-known minhashing algorithm to group signatures together. e hashing trick or minhashing
is a very fast algorithm for estimating how similar (in terms of Jaccard similarity) two sets are. Minhashing relies on
spliing strings into several chunks of the same length and computing a unique-output function (i.e. common hash
functions like MD5 or SHA1) for each chunk. Consequently, each signature produces a set of numbers, the minimum
of which is selected as the minhash. Finally, elements are grouped according to their minhashing values. Once the
minhashing values are computed, the probability of two signatures falling in the same group is shown to approximate
the Jaccard distance between them. e Jaccard distance between two sets A and B follows:
J (A,B) = |A ∩ B ||A ∪ B |
In other words, similar items will likely fall into similar minhash buckets. A detailed explanation of Minhashing, Jaccard
distance and all these terms may be found in [16].
We manually checked the resulting groups and developed a set of Python regular expressions to transform signatures
into malware classes according to the unveiled paerns. Since dierent signatures might contain dierent classes of mal-
ware, collisions may eventually occur within these rules. In this light, we established rule priority following rst match
criteria over the sorted rules (in terms of specicity). For instance, consider the signature: ”Adware.Android.AirPush.K”.
is signature would fall into the category Airpush, since it is more specic than Adware.
As a result, the generated classes group together similar paern signatures into a representative set of malware
classes. In contrast to AVClass, our approach keeps track of the relationship between the AV and the malware class
associated to the signatures.
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2.2 Normalized Signatures
# Regexp rule Class Category Det. Count No. Apps AVs
S1 .*a[ir]*push?.* Airpush
Adware
35,850 12,802 26
S2 .*leadbolt.* Leadbolt 17,414 4,045 21
S3 .*revmob.* Revmob 38,693 13,680 18
S4 .*startapp.* StartApp 29,443 11,963 13
S5 [os]*apperhand.* |.*counterclank.* Apperhand/Counterclank 1,606 716 12
S6 .*kuguo.* Kuguo 2,127 1,893 23
S7 wapsx? WAPS 1,546 344 6
S8 .*dowgin.*|dogwin Dogwin 1,098 421 23
S9 .*cauly.* Cauly 1,143 626 3
S10 [os]*wooboo Wooboo 220 120 14
S11 [os]*mobwin Mobwin 1,284 249 3
S12 .*droidkungfu.* DroidKungFu 105 54 3
S13 .*plankton.* Plankton 4,557 741 25
S14 [os]*you?mi Youmi 1,472 370 22
S15 [osoneclick]*fraud Fraud 736 382 19
S16 multiads Multiads 560 555 3
S17 .*adware.*|ad.+ Adware (gen) 33,133 24,515 46
S18 riskware Riskware
Harmful reats
1841 1353 14
S19 spr SPR 1,789 1,789 2
S20 .*deng.* Deng 2,926 2,926 1
S21 .*smsreg SMSreg 649 440 16
S22 [os]*covav? Cova 1,564 1,296 5
S23 .*denofow.* Denofow 1,224 610 11
S24 [os]*fakeash FakeFlash 1,381 510 15
S25 .*fakeapp.* FakeApp 518 420 14
S26 .*fakeinst.* FakeInst 493 401 22
S27 .*appinventor.* Appinventor 4,025 3,113 6
S28 .*swf.* SWF 4,651 4,566 10
S29 .*troj.* Trojan (gen) 23,775 16,851 49
S30 .*mobi.* Mobidash 981 796 16
S31 .*spy.* Spy 1483 1,221 26
S32 .*gin[ger]*master Gingermaster 58 36 10
S33 unclassiedmalware UnclassiedMalware
Unknown/Generic
857 855 1
S34 .*virus.* Virus 959 896 15
S35 .*heur.* Heur 182 179 15
S36 .*gen.* GEN 9,827 9,118 25
S37 [osgen]*pua PUA 1,249 1,152 2
S38 [ws]*reputation Reputation 2,886 2,885 1
S39 .*applicunwnt.* AppUnwanted 4,863 4,860 1
S40 .*artemi.* Artemis 9,662 6,175 2
S41 .* (Default Case) Other 10,778 7,880 57
TOTAL 259,608
Table 1. Regular Expressions in Python syntax to normalize signatures into standardized classes
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Table 1 shows 41 malware signature-based classes (S1, . . . , S41) obtained using the previous methodology. e table
contains the predicate of the regular expression for each rule, the class and a broader category of malware, along with
the detection and application counts of each rule. For instance, S1 contains all the cases of AirPush class, which belongs
to the Adware category. e AirPush class has been found in 12,802 Android apps and received 35,850 detections from
26 dierent AV engines.
e following lists a short summary of the three broad categories, namely emphAdware, Harmful reats and
Unknown/Generic, along with an explanation of the classes in each category.
• Adware is category includes those malware classes showing abusive advertisements for prot. ere are
in total 60, 538 applications tagged with at least one adware class. e Adware category involves most apps
in the collection, suggesting than most malicious applications inside Google Play are adware-related apps.
Leadbolt, Revmob, Startapp, WAPSX, Dowgin/dogwin, Cauly, Modwin and Apperhand/Counterclank are well-
known advertisement networks maliciously used to perform full screen and invasive advertising. Kuguo, is an
advertisement library also known due to the abuses commied by their developers. Youmi and DroidKungFu are
advertising services which have been involved in data ex-ltration problems. Airpush is another advertisement
network company known for the abuse of its developer of adbar pushing notications. Some AVs just mark
as Multiads applications that contain dierent advertisement libraries capable of displaying invasive ads.
Fraud/osoneclick refers to a fraudulent application which aempts to increase number of ad clicks in the app
by stealthily seling ads in the background of user interactive applications. Finally, the Adware (gen) tag is a
generic reference assigned to those samples only containing that known class.
• Harmful reats: is category includes more dangerous threats than simple adware, which may enrol the
user in premium services or ex-ltrate data through permission abuses or other exploits. ere are 29, 675
applications labelled at least once in this category. Deng, SPR (Security and Privacy Risk) and Riskware are
generic names given by dierent engines to ag apps that may unjustiably require potentially harmful
permissions or include malicious code threatening user privacy. Denofow and Cova are generic references to
trojan programs which aempts to enroll users in premium SMS services. SMSReg is a generic way for some
engines to ag applications that require SMS related permissions for ex-ltration or premium subscription.
FakeFlash, FakeInst or Fakeapp are names for applications that replicate the functionalities of other popular apps
adding to their code malicious code or actions. Appinventor is a developer platform used to build and generate
applications extensively preferred by malware developers. SWF stands for dierent versions of Shockwave
Flash Player Exploits. Trojan (gen) is the generic reference of engines to trojan applications. GingerMaster is a
well-known family of rooting exploits. Spy is a generic reference to applications incurring in data ex-ltration
or similar spyware threats.
• Unknown/Generic: is category includes AV detections which do not include class-related information,
either due to generic signatures from AVs or signatures not matching any rule in the dataset. ere are 23, 915
applications within this group. UnclassiedMalware, Virus, Heur (from heuristics), GEN (Generic Malware),
PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application), Reputation, AppUnwanted (Application Unwanted) and Artemis are
generic tags given by dierent engines in order to ag applications that are detected as not-specied threats.
Other includes the remaining applications which have not been classied due to the lack of signature paerns.
As shown in the table, most common malware detection classes are typically those regarding Adware, in particular
Revmob, Airpush and Adware with many AVs involved. Trojan detections are also very popular with 49 engines
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involved. In general, many malware classes are spoed by more than a single engine, with some exceptions in the
Unknown/Category category classes, which are oen exclusive from a small subset of engines, namely S33, S38, S39
with only one AV engine involved.
2.3 Comparison with AVClass [24]
We cloned the AVClass [24] repository from Github4 and checked its performance in our dataset. We observed that
the AVClass system returned undetermined class (SINGLETON output) for 48, 743 cases in our dataset, which is more
than 50% of the signatures. Oppositely, our methodology and AVClass agree on 24, 097 applications, roughly 29% of
the dataset. In this light, both approaches provide some level of agreement, as most specic classes match frequently
within the clearly dened detections.
However, AVClass returns a single class per application, but does not specify which AV engine is behind such
decision. In our methodology, we keep the (AV engine, Malware class) pair to allow further analysis since, in some
cases, dierent AVs disagree on some application (some may consider it as Adware while others consider the same
application as Harmful reat for instance).
2.4 Some insights from detections
Let A denote an indicator matrix of size 82, 866 × 61 whose elements Ai j ∈ {0, 1} are set to 1 if the i-th Android app has
been agged by the j-th engine or 0 otherwise. Matrix A is indeed very sparse with only 5% of all the entries set to one.
On average, each application is detected 3.135 ± 3.46 engines, showing that the variability of application detection
counts is enormous. e most active AV engines are AV27, AV58, AV7, AV2, AV30 and AV32, accounting for more than
10, 000 detections each.
Fig. 2 is a histogram of every application detection count in matrix A (a histogram of the row-sums). e histogram
shows a heavy-tail like distribution where most malware applications account for a small number of detections whilst
some few get much higher counts. Single-detection applications represent the majority of cases with a total of 38, 933
(46.9% of the total). In fact, no single application is agged by the 61 AV engines at once, being the highest detection
count for application no. 78, 692 with 53 hits.
Now, let B denote an indicator matrix of size 82, 866 × 41 whose elements Bi j ∈ {0, 1} are set to 1 if the i-th Android
app has been agged in the j-th malware category or 0 otherwise.
Fig. 3 represents the occurrence of each malware class. At a glance, the most common classes are adware-related
classes: generic adware applications and some precise libraries, namely Airpush, Leadbolt, Revmob and StartApp. e
reminding detections are more infrequent, with the exception of generic Trojan applications. erefore, most malware
applications in this collection appear to be adware cases.
Concerning matrix B, we observe that out of the 43, 933 multi-detection applications, 63.26% of them are assigned to
more than one class. In particular, these 27, 781 applications receive between 2 and 12 dierent class labels, showing
some level of disagreement between AV engines.
3 ANALYSIS OF MALWARE CLASSES AND CATEGORIES
As stated before, there are 38, 933 Android apps agged by a single AV engine. Of the rest (those with two AV detections
or more), in 16, 152 cases all AV detections agree on the same malware class, while the remiainng 27, 781 apps show some
4Available at hps://github.com/malicialab/avclass, last access May, 2017
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Fig. 2. AV detection count per application
kind of disagreement between AVs. In fact, some authors have proven the existing lack of consensus of engines [14] as
well as severe class naming inconsistencies among engines [18].
In this section, we analyze whether any of the inferred classes dier just because of naming inconsistencies or they
represent a set of independent classes.
3.1 Correlation of malware categories
Remark that the 41 malware classes have been classied into three large malware categories, namely Adware, Harmful
reats and Unknown/Generic. e three categories are very broad and the nature of the malware involved can be
dierent. Nevertheless, the detections in both Adware and Harmful categories separate malware into low-risk and
high-risk malware classes, as Adware samples are typically controversial and not detected by all the engines in the
same way whilst harmful classes indicate potentially major security risks, such as data leakage or economic loss.
In addition, the Unknown/General category integrates all those malware classes which do not refer to any specic
malware type, being just an indicator of undesired behaviors.
Let D refer to an 82, 866×3 matrix where Di j is an integer which accounts for the number of times the i-th application
has received a detection in category Adware (j = 1), Harmful (j = 2) or Unknown (j = 3). Table 2 shows the correlation
of such matrix D.
As shown, Harmful and Adware categories show lile correlation, only 0.06 which may refer to Android apps both
presenting Adware and being potentially Harmful. On the other hand, Unknown/Generic apps show 0.3 correlation
with Adware and 0.44 correlation with Harmful reats.
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Fig. 3. Frequency of detections per malware class
Adware Harmful Unknown
Adware 1 0.06 0.3
Harmful 0.06 1 0.44
Unknown 0.3 0.44 1
Table 2. Correlation of matrix D (Malware Categories)
Interestingly, it seems that Unknown detections agged by some AV engines appear more oen with Harmful reats
by other AV engines than with Adware cases, showing that Unknown detections are probably cases of Harmful reats.
is shall be further investigated in Section 4.
3.2 Identifying relationships with classes with graph community algorithms
Graph theory provides useful algorithms to study the relationships between objects within a network of entities. In our
case, starting from matrix B dened in Section 2.4 we compute its correlation matrix, i.e. Corr (B) and dene a Graph
G = (N ,E) whose adjacency matrix is Corr (B). us, graph G has 41 nodes (malware classes) and the weights of the
edges are equal to the correlation values between malware classes.
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Using node edge betweenness [11], we group together nodes according to their correlation values to see which
malware classes are close together. In order to avoid generating communities out of noise, we force all correlation
values below some Corrmin threshold to be equal to 0.
Adware
Airpush
Apperhand
Appinventor
AppUnwanted
Artemis
CaulyCova
Deng
Denofow
Dowgin
DroidKungFu
FakeApp
FakeFlash
FakeInst
Fraud
GEN
GingerMaster Heur
Kuguo
Leadbolt
Mobidash
Mobwin
Multiads
Other
Plankton
PUA
Reputation
Revmob
Riskware
SMSreg
SPR
Spy
startApp
SWF
Trojan
UnclassifiedMalware
Virus
WAPS
WooBoo
Youmi
(a) Corrmin = 0.2
Adware
Airpush
Apperhand
Appinventor
AppUnwanted
Artemis
Cauly
Cova
Deng
DenofowDowgin
DroidKungFu
FakeApp
FakeFlash
FakeInst
Fraud
GEN
GingerMaster
Heur
Kuguo
Leadbolt
Mobidash
Mobwin
MultiadsOther
Plankton
PUA
Reputation
Revmob
Riskware
SMSreg
SPR
Spy
startApp
SWF
Trojan
UnclassifiedMalware
Virus
WAPS
WooBoo
Youmi
(b) Corrmin = 0.35
Adware
Airpush
Apperhand
Appinventor
AppUnwanted
Artemis
Cauly
Cova
Deng
Denofow
Dowgin
DroidKungFu
FakeApp
FakeFlash
FakeInst
Fraud
GEN
GingerMaster
Heur
Kuguo
Leadbolt
Mobidash
Mobwin
Multiads
Other
Plankton
PUA
Reputation Revmob
Riskware
SMSreg
SPR
Spy
startApp
SWF
Trojan
UnclassifiedMalware
Virus
WAPS
WooBoo
Youmi
(c) Corrmin = 0.5
Fig. 4. Communities of malware classes for dierent correlation threshold Corrmin
Fig. 4 depicts the resulting communities obtained. Essentially, most malware classes appear isolated with lile
relationships with others, especially when the correlation threshold Corrmin = 0.5. In such a case, only two new
communities are created: FakeFlash-FakeApp and Plankton-Apperhand, the former in the Harmful category, the laer in
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the Adware category. In case of a lower correlation threshold, Corrmin = 0.35 a new community is identied: three
classes belonging to the Unknown/Generic category are aggregated with a Harmful class, creating the community
Trojan-Artemis-AppUnwanted-Other. is is consistent with the previous experiment where we observed that most
Unknown cases are more correlated with Harmful than with Adware cases. Finally, when the correlation threshold
Corrmin = 0.2 we observe other interesting communities with weak correlation.
4 MODELLING CONSENSUS
In this section, we further investigate on AV engines and malware categories using Structure Equation Models (SEM) to
identify which AVs are more powerful at detecting Adware, Harmful reats and Unknown/Generic categories.
4.1 On weighting AV engines
In order to obtain a performance score per engine within our dataset, a collective AV model must consider how AV
engines behave collectively in the sense that which AV engines are consistent with other and which ones typically
disagrees with the rest. is idea is at the heart of the well-known Latent Variable Models (LVM) which assume the
existence of some unobservable ”latent” or ”hidden” variable (i.e. whether an app is of malware category or not) which
explains the underlying relation among the observed variables (i.e. the output of the AV engines).
ere exist dierent approaches to Latent Variable Modeling in the literature, such as generative models or Structural
Equation Models (SEM). We have chosen the later due to its ease of use and approach, based on covariance approximation,
which weight engines according on how consensual their detections are.
Typically, SEM assumes a linear regression model on the latent or hidden variable, namely Zsem :
Zsem =
61∑
i=1
ωi × XAV i (1)
where XAV i refers to the observed variables AVi weighted by coecients ωi . In order to shape values to a probabilistic
scale, we use the logistic function to translate the Zsem score into a probabilistic value (between 0 and 1), following:
Psem =
eZsem
1 + eZsem
(2)
4.2 Inference and Results
We generate three 0/1 matrices, one per category (Adware, Harmful reats and Unknown/Generic), of size Apps ×AVs .
ese matrices are used for training three Zsem models using the R-library ”lavaan” [22], which estimates the ω
coecients by minimizing the dierence between the dataset covariance matrix and the covariance matrix from the
generated model. e ω coecients are shown in Fig. 5 for the three models.
e gure clearly unveils the existing dierences across engines: some AVs rank high scores at specic categories,
while others are terrible on all three categories. For instance, AV6 excels at harmful applications (coecient 0.8) but has
null properties (coecient 0) for Adware or Unknown malware; AV6 is very good at Harmful reats (coecients 0.8
for harmful threats and 0 for the other two categories) and AV41 is excellent with unknown categories (0.7). Other
AV engines have acceptable coecients for more than one category, such as AV1 or AV15. In fact, adware-detecting
engines, appear with very high coecients whereas unknown detections occur notably across most engines.
e picture also shows clearly that there is no AV engine in this collection which excels in the three categories at
the same time, even though, engines such as AV31 (0.99, 0.31, 0.2) or AV42 (0.99, 0.37, 0.25) show some of the best
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Fig. 5. ZSEM coeicients for each category
balances above all engines. Indeed, AV1, AV15, AV31 and AV42 present strong agreements and strong correlation values,
providing high support from one another.
It is also worth noting the spikes of some AV engines at the Unknown category (see AV13, AV46, AV54, AV58 or
AV60). Essentially, these engines do not provide information on Adware or Harmful reats, instead they output a
generic malware signature, and therefore receive low weights on such categories.
Finally, as an example of application of the Zsem models, consider app no. 1, 144. is app has been agged as
Adware by 20 AVs, as Harmful by AV47, and Unknown by AV22, AV39 and AV40. We can then apply eq. 1 to obtain the
Zsem values for the three categories which yields:
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Z
(1,144,Adware)
sem = 4.66
Z
(1,144,Harmf ul )
sem = 3.8
Z
(1,144,Unknown)
sem = 3.91
(3)
Aer applying the logistic transformation of eq. 2, we obtain the following probabilities:
P
(1,144,Adware)
sem = 0.99
P
(1,144,Harmf ul )
sem = 0.97
P
(1,144,Unknown)
sem = 0.98
(4)
In this case, it would be safe to say that this application lies in all categories of malware: Adware, Harmful and
Generic.
On the other hand, Android app no. 11, 581 has been agged as Adware by AV7, AV14 and AV36, as Harmful by AV4,
and Unknown by AV36. According to the SEM model, the following probabilities for each category are obtained:
P
(11,581,Adware)
sem = 0.588
P
(11,581,Harmf ul )
sem = 0.61
P
(11,581,Unknown)
sem = 0.54
(5)
Checking the coecients of these AV engines on each category in Fig. 5, we observe that AV7, AV14 and AV36 have low
coecients for Adware, while AV4 and AV36 also have low coecient values for Harmful and Unknown respectively.
Perhaps, the Harmful category is more likely according to the estimation provided by the SEM mmodel despite the app
has more Adware detections. However, it is not clear whether or not this application represents a real risk to the user.
As a nal example, Android app 67, 119, which accounts 14 detections clearly votes on favor for the Adware category:
P
(67,119,Adware)
sem = 0.91
P
(67,119,Harmf ul )
sem = 0.62
P
(67,119,Unknown)
sem = 0.89
(6)
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
is paper has analyzed 259, 608 malware signatures produced by 61 AV engines to 82, 866 dierent Android applications.
With this dataset, we have:
• Presented a novel signature normalization methodology capable of mapping dierent AV signatures into 41
standardized classes.
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• Analyzed the most frequent keywords and signature categories using text mining and minhashing techniques,
and classied malware signatures into three categories: Adware, Harmful threats and Unknown/Generic.
• Identied groups of similar malware classes within the data using Community detection algorithms from
Graph eory.
• Used Structural Equation Models to nd most powerful AV engines for each of the three malware category.
• Shown an application on how to use such SEM model to infer which Unknown-type applications are closer to
Adware or Harmful type.
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